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Abstract
Differential privacy offers a formal framework for reasoning about privacy and accuracy of com-
putations on private data. It also offers a rich set of building blocks for constructing data analyses.
When carefully calibrated, these analyses simultaneously guarantee privacy of the individuals con-
tributing their data, and accuracy of their results for inferring useful properties about the population.
The compositional nature of differential privacy has motivated the design and implementation of sev-
eral programming languages aimed at helping a data analyst in programming differentially private
analyses. However, most of the programming languages for differential privacy proposed so far pro-
vide support for reasoning about privacy but not for reasoning about accuracy of data analyses. To
overcome this limitation, in this work we present DPella, a programming framework providing data
analysts with support for reasoning about privacy, accuracy and their trade-offs. The distinguished
feature of DPella is a novel component which statically tracks the accuracy of different data anal-
yses. In order to make tighter accuracy estimations, this component leverages taint analysis for
automatically inferring statistical independence of the different noise quantities added for guarantee-
ing privacy. We show the flexibility of our approach by not only implementing classical counting
queries (e.g., CDFs) but also by analyzing hierarchical counting queries (like those done by Census
Bureaus), where accuracy have different constrains per level and data analysts should figure out the
best manner to calibrate privacy to meet the accuracy requirements.
1 Introduction
Large amounts of individuals data are collected and stored every day for research or statistical purposes.
Privacy concerns about the individuals contributing their data restrict the way information can be used
and released. Differential privacy (DP) [1] is emerging as a viable solution to release statistical informa-
tion about the population without compromising data subjects’ privacy. A standard way to achieve DP
is adding some statistical noise to the result of a data analysis. If the noise is carefully calibrated, it
provides a privacy protection for the individuals contributing their data, and at the same time it provides
accurate information about the population from which the data are drawn. Thanks to its quantitative
formulation quantifying privacy by means of the parameter ǫ, DP provides a mathematical framework for
rigorously reasoning about the privacy-accuracy trade-offs. To be more precise, the accuracy requirement
is not baked in the definition of DP, rather it is a constraint that is made explicit for a specific task at
hand when a differentially private data analysis is designed.
An important property of DP is composeability: multiple differentially private data analyses can be
composed with a graceful degradation of the privacy parameter ǫ. This property allow one to reason
about privacy as a budget : a data analyst can decide how much privacy budget (the ǫ parameter)to
assign to each of her analyses. The compositionality aspects of DP motivated the design of several
programming frameworks [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] and tools [14, 15, 16, 17] with built-
in basic data analyses to help data analysts to design their own differentially private data analysis.
At an high level, most of these programming frameworks and tools are based on a similar idea for
reasoning about privacy: use some primitives for basic tasks in DP as building blocks, and use composition
properties to combine these building blocks making sure that the privacy cost of each data analysis
sum up and that the total cost does not exceed the privacy budget. Programming frameworks such
as [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] in addition usually also provides general support to further
combine, through programming techniques, the different building blocks and the results of the different
1
data analyses. Differently, tools such as [14, 15, 16, 17] usually are optimized for specific tasks at the
price of restricting the kinds of data analyses they can support.
Unfortunately, this simple approach for privacy cannot be directly applied to accuracy. Reasoning
about accuracy is less compositional than reasoning about privacy, and it depends both on the specific
task at hand and on the specific accuracy measure that one is interested in offering to data analysts.
Despite this, when restricted to specific mechanisms and specific forms of data analyses, one can measure
accuracy through estimates given as confidence intervals, or error bounds. As an example, most of the
standard mechanisms from the differential privacy literature come with theoretical confidence intervals
or error bounds that can be exposed to data analysts in order to allow them to take informed decisions
about the analyses that they want to run. This approach has been integrated in tools such as GUPT [15],
PSI [17], and Apex [18]. Users of these tools, can specify the target confidence interval they want to
achieve, and the tools adjust accordingly the privacy parameters, when sufficient budget is available1.
In contrast, all the programming frameworks proposed thus far [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] do
not offer any support to programmers or data analysts for tracking, and reasoning about, the accuracy of
their data analyses. This phenomenon is in large part due to the non-compositional nature of accuracy
when providing confidence intervals for arbitrary queries that users of these frameworks may want to
program and run.
In this paper we address this limitation by building a programming framework for designing differen-
tially private data analysis which also supports a compositional form of reasoning about accuracy. We
achieve this by internalizing the use of probabilistic bounds [19] describing how to compose different con-
fidence intervals or error bounds. Probabilistic bounds are part of the classical toolbox for the analysis
of randomized algorithms [19], and are the tools that differential privacy algorithms designers usually
employ for the accuracy analysis of classical mechanisms [20, 21]. Two important probabilistic bounds
are the union bound, that can be used to compose errors with no assumption on the way the random noise
is generated, and Chernoff bound, which applies to the sum of random noise when the different random
variables characterizing noise generation are statistically independent. When applicable, and when the
number of random variables grows, Chernoff bound usually gives a much “tighter” error estimation than
the union bound. We give a detailed formulation of these bounds in Section 4.
Our main contributtion is showing that probabilistic bounds can be smoothly integrated in a program-
ming framework for differential privacy by using techniques from information-flow control [22] (in the
form of taint analysis [23]). While these probabilistic bounds are not enough to express every accuracy
guarantees one wants to express for arbitrary data analyses, they allow the analysis of a large class of
user-designed programs, complementing in this way the approach followed by tools such as GUPT [15],
PSI [17], and Apex [18].
Our Contribution
We present DPella, acronym for Differential Privacy in Haskell with accuracy, a programming framework
where programmers and data analysts can explore the privacy-accuracy trade-off while writing their
differentially private data analyses. The analyses that can be expressed in DPella are data independent
and can be configured to used different norms for the accuracy of vectors. They consist on counting
queries (the bread and butter of statistical analysis), average, and noisy max as well as any aggregation
of their results. DPella is an API implemented as a library in the general purpose language Haskell2;
a programming language that is well-known to support information-flow analyses as libraries [24, 25]—
rather than creating interpreters or compilers from scratch as it is usually the case. The API, and our
accuracy calculations, are designed to be extensible through the addition of new primitives and new error
measures. In that manner, we expect DPella to expand the classes of supported analyses in the future.
One of the main contribution of DPella is the compositional approach to reasoning about accuracy
when combining queries’ results. DPella extracts this information from a program implementing a data
analysis through a symbolic interpretation of the program and type-level reasoning. More specifically,
DPella builds an abstract-syntax tree corresponding to the query that the programmer or data analyst
is writing. The tree carries information about the sensitivity3 of the query which is collected at the
type-level and needed to both guarantee privacy and accuracy. DPella provides to the data analysts two
1Apex actually goes beyond this by also helping user by selecting the right differentially private mechanism to achieve
the required accuracy. Besides, it uses a combination off theoretical error bounds and statistical estimation, to provide
confidence intervals for a large set of queries.
2https://www.haskell.org/
3A quantitative measure of how much a query might amplify differences in the output, the formal definition is in
Section 2.
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distinct ways to symbolically interpret such abstract-syntax tree: one for privacy and one for accuracy.
DPella’s interpretation for privacy consists on decreasing the privacy budget of a query by deducing the
required budget of its sub-parts. On the other hand, the accuracy interpretation uses as abstraction the
inverse Cumulative Distribution Function (iCDF) representing an upper bound to the (theoretical) error
that the program incurs when guaranteeing DP. The iCDF of a query is build out of the iCDFs of the
different components, by using as a basic composition principle the union bound. These interpretations
provide overestimates of the corresponding quantities that they track. In order to make these estimates
as precise as possible, DPella uses taint analysis to track the use of noise to identify which variables
are statistically independent. This information is used by DPella to soundly replace, when needed, the
union bounds with Chernoff bounds, something that to the best of our knowledge also program analyses
focusing on accuracy, such as [26], do not consider.
We envision these two ways to symbolically interpret queries by data analysts as a mean to reason
about privacy and accuracy. In our experiments, we used them to implement two kind of programs in
DPella. First, we wrote programs that repetitively call the interpreters on queries with different values of
ǫ to visualize the errors incurred by data analyses—this allows data analyst to choose different values of
ǫ depending on the accuracy that she/he wants to achieve. Second, we used the interpretations to write
optimization functions aiming at finding the minimal ǫ for a given level of accuracy in data analyses, this
is, minimizing the privacy loss of an analysis. These use cases align with the classical uses of tools such
as GUPT, PSI, and Apex.
In summary, our contributions are:
◮ We present DPella, a programming framework that allows data analysts to explore the privacy-
accuracy trade-off. DPella combines symbolic interpretation and type-level analyses to support rea-
soning in a uniform way about privacy and accuracy. DPella codebase consists of just 540 lines of
Haskell code.
◮ We show how to use taint analysis to detect statistical independence of the noise that different
primitives add, and how to use this information to achieve better error estimates.
◮ We show on several examples how DPella can help data analysts to explore the trade-offs between
the competing properties of privacy and accuracy.
◮ We showcase DPella’s error estimations by implementing PINQ-like queries from previous work [27,
2, 28] as well as some workloads from the matrix mechanism [29, 30, 31].
2 DPella by example
In this section, we present an overview of DPella, showcasing each of its components. We start by
providing a brief background on the notions of privacy and accuracy DPella considers.
2.1 Background
Differential privacy [1] is a quantitative notion of privacy that bounds how much a single individual’s
private data can affect the result of a data analysis. More formally, we can define differential privacy as
a property of a randomized query Q˜(·) representing the data analysis, as follow.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy (DP)[1]). A randomized query Q˜(·) : db→ R satisfies ǫ-differential
privacy if and only if for any two datasets D1 and D2 in db, which differ in one row, and for every
output set S ⊆ R we have
Pr[Q˜(D1) ∈ S] 6 eǫ Pr[Q˜(D2) ∈ S] (1)
In the definition above, the parameter ǫ determines a bound on the distance between the distributions
induced by Q˜(·) when adding or removing an individual from the dataset—the farther away they are,
the more at risk the privacy of an individual is, and vice versa. In other words, ǫ imposes a limit on the
privacy loss that an individual can incur in, as a result of running a data analysis.
A standard way to achieve ǫ-differential privacy is adding some carefully calibrated noise to the result
of a query. To protect all the different ways in which an individual’s data can affect the result of a
query, the noise needs to be calibrated to the maximal change that the result of the query can have when
changing an individual’s data. This is formalized through the notion of sensitivity.
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Definition 2.2 ([1]). The (global) sensitivity of a query Q(·) : db→ R is the quantity:
∆Q = max{|Q(D1)−Q(D2)| for D1, D2 differing in one row}
The sensitivity gives a measure of the amount of noise needed to protect one individual’s data. Besides,
in order to achieve differential privacy it is also important the choice of the kind of noise that one adds.
A standard approach is based on the addition of noise sampled from the Laplace distribution.
Theorem 2.1 (Laplace Mechanism [1]). Let Q(·) : db→ R be a deterministic query with sensitivity ∆Q.
Let Q˜(·) : db → R be a randomized query defined as Q˜(D) = Q(D) + N , where N is sample from the
Laplace distribution with mean µ = 0 and scale b = ∆Q/ǫ. Then Q˜ is ǫ-differentially private.
Notice that in the theorem above, for a given query, the smaller the ǫ is, the more noise Q˜(·) needs
to inject in order to hide the contribution of one individual’s data to the result—this protects privacy
but degrades how meaningful the result of the query is. In contrast, the bigger the ǫ, the less noise Q(·)
needs to inject—this increases the accuracy of the result but degrades privacy.
DPella enables data analysts and programmers to explore the trade-offs between privacy and accuracy
by giving bound estimates on the errors caused by noise addition mechanisms, such as the Laplace
mechanism introduced above. In general, the notion of accuracy can be defined more formally as follows.
Definition 2.3 (Accuracy, see e.g.[20]). Given an ǫ-differentiallly private query Q˜(·), a target query
Q(·), a distance function d(·), a bound α, and the probability β, we say that Q˜(·) is (d(·), α, β)-accurate
with respect to Q(·) if and only if for all dataset D:
Pr[d(Q˜(D)−Q(D)) > α] 6 β (2)
This definition allows one to express data independent error statements such as: with probability at
least 1− β the query Q˜(D) diverge from Q(D), in terms of the distance d(·), for less than α. Then, we
will refer to α as the error and 1− β as the confidence probability or simply confidence. In general, the
lower the β is, i.e., the higher the confidence probability is, the higher the error α is. On the other hand,
the higher the β is, i.e., the lower the confidence probability is, the lower the error is. In this case, the
prediction will be valid less often than with a lower β.
As discussed in the previous section, an important property of differential privacy is composeability.
Theorem 2.2 (Sequential Composition [1]). Let Q˜1(·) and Q˜2(·) be two queries which are ǫ1- and ǫ2-
differentially private, respectively. Then, their sequential composition Q˜(·) = (Q˜1(·), Q˜2(·)) is (ǫ1 + ǫ2)-
differentially private.
Theorem 2.3 (Parallel Composition [2]). Let Q˜(·) be a ǫ-differentially private query. and data1, data2
be a partition of the set of data. Then, the query Q˜1(D) = (Q˜(D∩data1), Q˜(D∩data2)) is ǫ-differentially
private.
Thanks to the composition properties of differential privacy, we can think about ǫ as a privacy budget
that one can spend on a given data before compromising the privacy of individuals’ contributions to
that data. The global ǫ for a given program can be seen as the privacy budget for the entire data. This
budget can be consumed by selecting the local ǫ to “spend” in each intermediate query. Thanks to the
composition properties, by tracking the local ǫ that are consumed, one can guarantee that a data analysis
will not consume more than the allocated privacy budget.
Given an ǫ, DPella gives data analysts the possibility to explore how to spend it on different queries
and analyze the impact on accuracy. For instance, data analysts might decide to spend “more” epsilon
on sub-queries which results are required to be more accurate, while spending “less” on the others. The
next examples (inspired by the use of DP in network trace analyses [27]) show how DPella helps to
quantify what “more” and “less” means.
2.2 Example: CDF
Suppose we have a tcpdump trace of packets which yields a table where each row is represented as list
of String values containing the following information:
[<id>, <timestamp>, <src>, <dest>, <protocol>, <length>, <payload> ]
4
1 cdf1 bins eps dataset = do
2 sizes ← dpSelect getPktLen dataset
3 counts← sequence [ do elems← dpWhere (6 bin)
4 sizes
5 dpCount localEps elems
6 | bin← bins ]
7 return (norm∞ counts)
8 where localEps = eps / (length bins)
(a) Sequential approach
9 cdf2 bins eps dataset = do
10 sizes← dpSelect ((6 max bins) ◦ getPktLen) dataset
11 -- parts :: Map Integer (Value Double)
12 parts← dpPartRepeat (dpCount eps) bins assignBin
13 sizes
14 let counts = Map.elems parts
15 cumulCounts = [add (take i counts)
16 | i← [1 . . length counts ]]
17 return (norm∞ cumulCounts)
(b) Parallel approach
Figure 1: CDF’s implementations
From this table, we would like to inspect—in a differentially private manner—the packet’s length
distribution by computing its Cumulative Distribution function (CDF), defined as CDF(x) = number of
records with value 6 x. Hence, we are just interested in the values of the attribute <length>.
In order to guarantee differential privacy, we need to add some randomness to our computation. So,
the result will be an approximated version of the original CDF. How to best approximate a data analysis
often depends on several properties of the data analysis itself. For the case of CDF, McSherry and
Mahajan [27] proposed three different ways to approximate it, and they argued for their different levels
of accuracy. We revise two of these approximations here (and the third one can be found in the extended
version of the paper) to show how DPella can assist in showing the accuracy of these analyses.
2.2.1 Sequential CDF
A simple approach to compute the CDF consists in splitting the range of lengths into bins and, for each
bin, count the number of records that are 6 bin. A natural way to make this computation differentially
private is to add independent Laplace noise to each count.
We show how to do this using DPella in Figure 1a. We define a function cdf1 which takes as input
the list of bins describing length ranges, the amount of budget eps to be spent by the entire query, and
the dataset where it will be computed. For now, we assume that we have a fixed list of bins for packets’
length. cdf1 uses the primitive transformation
4 dpSelect provided by DPella to obtain from the dataset
the length of each packet via a selector function getPktLen :: String → Integer. This computation
results in a new dataset sizes. Then, we create a counting query for each bin using the primitive
dpWhere provided by DPella. This filters all records that are less than the bin under consideration
(6 bin). Finally, we perform a noisy count using the DPella primitive dpCount. The noise injected by
the primitive dpCount is calibrated so that the execution of dpCount is localEps-DP (line 8 5). The
function sequence then takes the list of queries and compute them sequentially collecting their results
in a list—to create a list of noisy counts. We then return this list. The combinator norm∞ in line 7 is
used to mark where we want the accuracy information to be collected, but it does not have any impact
on the actual result of the cdf.
On the privacy side, DPella provides primitives to statically explore the privacy budget. For instance,
to ensure that cdf1 is eps-differential privacy, we distributed the given budget eps evenly among the
sub-queries (this is done in lines 5 and 8). However, a data analyst may forget to do so, e.g., she can
4Anticipating on Section 3, in our code we will usually use the red color for transformations, the blue color for aggregate
operations, and the green color for combinators for privacy and accuracy.
5The casting operation fromIntegral is omitted for clarity
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define localEps = eps, and in this case the final query is (length bins)*eps-DP, which is a significant
change in the query’s privacy price. To prevent such budget miscalculations or unintended expenditure
of privacy budget, DPella provides the analyst with the function budget (see Section 3) that, given a
query, statically computes an upper bound on how much budget it will spend. To see how to use this
function, consider the function cdf1 and a its modified version cdf
′
1 with localEps = eps. Suppose
that we want to compute how much budget will be consumed by running it on a list of bins of size 10
(identified as bins10) and on a dataset networkTraffic. Then, the data analyst can ask this as follow:
>budget (cdf1 bins10 1 networkTraffic)
ǫ = 1
>budget (cdf′1 bins10 1 networkTraffic)
ǫ = 10
The function budget will not execute the query, it simply performs an static analysis on the code of the
query by symbolically interpreting it. The static analysis uses information encoded by the type of the
database networkTraffic (explained in Section 3). For budget to work, it is not necessary to provide
the real dataset, just a dataset with the same static information.
DPella also provides primitives to statically explore the accuracy of a query. The function accuracy
takes a query Q(·) and a probability β and returns an estimate of the (theoretical) error that can be
achieved with confidence probability 1 − β. Suppose that we want to estimate the error we will incur
in by running cdf1 with a budget of ǫ = 1 on with the same list of bins and dataset as above, and we
want to have this estimate for β = 0.05 and β = 0.2, respectively. Then, the data analyst can ask this
as follow:
>accuracy (cdf1 bins10 1 networkTraffic) 0.05
α = 53
>accuracy (cdf1 bins10 1 networkTraffic) 0.2
α = 40
Since the result of the query is a vector of counts, we measure the error α in terms of ℓ∞ distance
with respect to the CDF without noise. This is the max difference that we can have in a bin due to the
noise. The way to read the information provided by DPella is that with confidence 95% and 80%, we
have errors 53 and 40, respectively. These error bounds can be used by a data analyst to figure out the
exact set of parameters that would be useful for her task.
2.2.2 Parallel CDF
Another way to compute a CDF is by first generating an histogram of the data according to the bins,
and then building a cumulative sum for each bin. To make this function private, an approach could
be to add noise at the different bins of the histogram, rather than to the cumulative sums themself, so
that we could use the parallel composition, rather than the sequential one [27], which we show how to
implement in DPella in Figure 1b. The symbol :: is used to describe the type of terms in Haskell and
double-dashes are used to introduce single-line comments.
In cdf2, we first select all the packages whose length is smaller than the maximum bin, and then
we partition the data accordingly to the given list of bins. To do this, we use dpPartRepeat operator
to create as many (disjoint) datasets as given bins, where each record in each partition belongs to the
range determined by an specific bin—where the record belongs is determined by the function assignBin::
Integer→ Integer. After creating all partitions, the primitive dpPartRepeat computes the given query
dpCount eps in each partition—the name dpPartRepeat comes from repetitively calling dpCount eps as
many times as partitions we have. As a result, dpPartRepeat returns a finite map where the keys are
the bins and the elements are the noisy count of the records per partition—i.e., the histogram. In what
follows (lines 15–17), we compute the cumulative sums of the noisy counts using the DPella primitive
add, and finally we build and return the list of values denoting the CDF.
The privacy analysis of cdf2 is similar to the one of cdf1, except that one can use the parallel
composition, rather then the sequential one.
>budget (cdf2 bins10 1 networkTraffic)
ǫ = 1
The accuracy analysis of cdf2 is more interesting: first it gets error bounds for each cumulative sum,
then these are used to give an error bound on the maximum error of the vector. The symbolic analysis
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Figure 2: Error comparison (95% confidence)
of DPella implements this combination in an effective way. For the error bounds on the cumulative sums
DPella uses either the union bound or the Chernoff bound, depending on which one gives the lowest
error. For the maximum error of the vector, DPella uses the union bound, similarly to what happens in
cdf1. Using DPella, also in this case, a data analyst can explore the accuracy of cdf2.
>accuracy (cdf2 bins10 1 networkTraffic) 0.05
α = 22
>accuracy (cdf2 bins10 1 networkTraffic) 0.2
α = 20
2.2.3 Exploring the privacy-accuracy trade-off
Let us assume that a data analyst is interested in running a CDF with an error bounded with 90%
confidence, i.e., with β = 0.1, having three bins (named bins3), and ǫ = 1. With those assumptions in
mind, which implementation should she use? To answer that question, the data analyst can ask DPella:
>accuracy (cdf1 bins3 1 networkTraffic) 0.1
α = 11
>accuracy (cdf2 bins3 1 networkTraffic) 0.1
α = 12
So, the analyst would know that using cdf1 in this case would give, likely, a lower error. Suppose further
that the data analyst realize that she prefers to have a finer granularity and have 10 bins, instead of only
3. Which implementation should she use? Again, she can compute:
>accuracy (cdf1 bins10 1 networkTraffic) 0.1
α = 46
>accuracy (cdf2 bins10 1 networkTraffic) 0.1
α = 20
So, the data analyst would know that using cdf2 in this case would give, likely, a lower error. One can
also use DPella to show a comparison between cdf1 and cdf2 in terms of error when we keep the privacy
parameter fixed and we change the number of bins, where cdf2 gives a better error when the number
of bins is large [27] as illustrated in Figure 2. In the figure, we also show the empirical error to confirm
that our estimate is tight—the oscillations on the empirical cdf1 are given by the relative small (300)
number of experimental runs we consider.
Now, what if the data analyst choose to use cdf2 because of what we discussed before but she realizes
that she can afford an error α 6 50; what would be then the epsilon that gives such α? One of the feature
of DPella is that the analyst can write a simple program that finds it by repetitively calling accuracy
with different epsilons—this is one of the advantages of providing a programming framework. In this
case, the answer is 0.42:
>accuracy (cdf2 bins10 0.42 networkTraffic) 0.1
α = 49
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-- Transformations (data analyst)
dpWhere :: (r→ Bool) → Data s r → Query (Data s r)
dpGroupBy :: Eq k ⇒ (r→ k) → Data s r → Query (Data (2*s) (k, [r ]))
dpIntersect :: Eq r ⇒ Data s1 r→ Data s2 r→ Query (Data (s1+s2) r)
dpSelect :: (r→ r′) → Data s r → Query (Data s r′)
dpUnion :: Data s1 r → Data s2 r→ Query (Data (s1+s2) r)
dpPart :: Ord k⇒ (r→ k) → Data s r → Map k (Data s r)→ Query (Value a))
→ Query (Map k (Value a))
-- Aggregations (data analyst)
dpCount :: Stb s⇒ ǫ → Data s r→ Query (Value Double)
dpSum :: Stb s⇒ ǫ → (r→ Double)→ Data s r→ Query (Value Double)
dpAvg :: Stb s⇒ ǫ → (r→ Double)→ Data s r→ Query (Value Double)
dpMax :: ǫ→ (r→ Double)→ Data 1 r→ Query (Value Integer)
-- Budget
budget :: Query a→ ǫ
-- Execution (data curator)
dpEval :: (Data 1 r→ Query (Value a))→ [r ]→ ǫ→ IO a
Figure 3: DPella API: Part I
These different use cases shows the flexibility of DPella for different tasks in private data analysis. The
following sections will introduce the theoretical and technical aspects of DPella, more concretely, Section 3
presents DPella’s API and how does it enforce DP. Section 4 describes the technicalities of the accuracy
calculations, followed by Section 5 where we expose the versatility of the framework with case studies.
Lastly, we put our framework in context presenting some related work in Section 6 followed by the
conclusions and future work (Section 7).
3 Privacy
A query written in DPella can be thought as a sequence of operations responsible to transform sensitive
dataset for then obtaining aggregated data like the amount of rows in a dataset. DPella provides noised
version of data aggregation operations by implementing a Laplace mechanism as described in Theorem
2.1. To ensure that data releases satisfy differential privacy despite transformations, the noise injected is
calibrated to the impact that such transformations can have on the data—a concept known as stability
[2] (explained below). Different than, e.g., PINQ [2], one novelty of DPella is that it computes stability
statically using Haskell’s type-system.
Queries written in DPella have an invariant enforced by construction: it is not possible to branch on
results produced by aggregations. While it might seem restrictive, it enables to write counting queries,
which are the bread and butter of statistical analysis and have been the focus of the majority of the work
in DP. Despite such restriction, DPella can be extended with data analyses branching on noisy-values
by simply incorporating them as black-box primitives, e.g., noisy-max is incorporated in this manner by
DPella.
Terminology DPella have two kind of actors: data curators, who decide the global privacy budget and
split that budget among data analysts, and data analysts, who write queries to mine useful information
from the data and spend the budget they received. DPella is designed to help data analysts to have an
informed decision about how to spend their budget based on exploring the trade-offs between privacy
and accuracy.
3.1 Components of the API
Figure 3 shows part of DPella API. DPella introduces two abstract data types to respectively denote
datasets and queries:
data Data s r -- datasets
data Query a -- queries
The attentive reader might have observed that the API also introduces the data type Value a. However,
we defer its explanation for Section 4 since it is only used for accuracy calculations—for this section,
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readers can consider the type Value a as isomorphic to the type a. Values of type Data s r represent
sensitive datasets with accumulated stability s, where each row is of type r. Accumulated stability, on the
other hand, is instantiated to type-level positive natural numbers, i.e., 1, 2, etc. Stability is a measure
that captures the number of rows in the dataset that could have been affected by transformations like
selection or grouping of rows. In DP research, stability is associated with dataset transformations rather
than with datasets themselves. In order to simplify type signatures, DPella uses the type parameter s
in datasets to represent the accumulated stability of the transformations for which datasets have gone
through.
Values of type Query a represent computations, or queries, that yield values of type a. Type Query a is
a monad [32], and because of this, computations of type Query a are built by two fundamental operations:
return :: a→ Query a
(>>=) :: Query a→ (a→ Query b)→ Query b
The operation return x returns a query that just produces the value x without causing side-effects, i.e.,
without touching any dataset. The function (>>=)—called bind—is used to sequence queries and their
associated side-effects. Specifically, qp>>= f executes the query qp, takes its result, and passes it to the
function f, which then returns a second query to run. Some languages, like Haskell, provide syntactic
sugar for monadic computations known as do-notation. For instance, the program qp1 >>= (λx1 →
qp2 >>= (λx2 → return (x1, x2))), which performs queries qp1 and qp2 and returns their results in a
pair, can be written as do x1 ← qp1; x2 ← qp2; return (x1, x2) which gives a more “imperative” feeling
to programs. We split the API in four parts: transformations, aggregations, budget prediction, and
execution of queries. (We defer to the next section the description of the API related to accuracy
calculations.) The first three parts are intended to be used by data analysts, while the last one is
intended to be only used by data curators6.
3.1.1 Transformations
The primitive dpWhere filters rows in datasets based on a predicate functions (r → Bool). The created
query (of type Query (Data s r)) produces a dataset with the same row type r and accumulated stability
s as the dataset given as argument (Data s r). Observe that if we consider two datasets which differ in
s rows in two given executions, and we apply dpWhere to both of them, we will obtain datasets that will
still differ in s rows—thus, the accumulated stability remains the same. The primitive dpGroupBy returns
a dataset where rows with the same key are grouped together. The functional argument (of type r→ k)
maps rows to keys of type k. The rows in the return dataset (Data (2*s) (k, [r])) consist of key-rows pairs
of type (k, [r ])—syntax [r ] denotes the type of lists of elements of type r. What appears on the left-hand
side of the symbol ⇒ are type constraints. They can be seen as static demands for the types appearing
on the right-hand side of ⇒. Type constraint Eq k demands type k, denoting keys, to support equality;
otherwise grouping rows with the same keys is not possible. The accumulated stability of the new dataset
is multiplied by 2 in accordance with stability calculations for transformations [2, 34]—observe that 2*s
is a type-level multiplication done by a type-level function (or type family [35]) *. Our API also considers
transformations similar to those found in SQL like intersection (dpIntersect), union (dpUnion), and
selection (dpSelect) of datasets, where the accumulated stability is updated accordingly. We do not
provide joins as transformations since supporting them is knwon to be challenging [2, 36, 37, 38]. The
output of a join may contain duplicates of sensitive rows, which makes difficult to bound the accumulated
stability of datasets. DPella therefore assumes that all the considered information is contained by the
rows of given datasets.
3.1.2 Partition
Primitive dpPart deserves special attention. This primitive is a mixture of a transformation and ag-
gregations since it partitions the data (transformation) to subsequently apply aggregations on each
of them. More specifically, this primitive partitions the given dataset (Data s r) based on a row-to-
key mapping (r → k). Then, it takes a partition for a given key k and applies it to the correspond-
ing function Data s r → Query (Value a), which is given as an element of a key-query mapping
(Map k ((Data s r)→ Query (Value a))). Subsequently, it returns the values produced at every partition
as a key-value mapping (Query (Map k (Value a))). The primitive dpPartRepeat used by the examples
in Section 2 is implemented as a special case of dpPart and thus we do not discuss it further.
6A separation that can be enforced via Haskell modules [33]
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1 q :: ǫ→ [Color ]→ Data 1 Double
2 → Query (Map Color Double)
3 q eps bins dataset = dpPart id dataset dps
4 where dps = fromList [(c, λds→ dpCount eps dataset)
5 -- dps = fromList [(c, λds→ dpCount eps ds
6 | c← bins ]
Figure 4: DP-histograms by using dpPart
Partition is one of the most important operators to save privacy budget. It allows to run the same
query on a dataset’s partitions but only paying for one of them—recall Theorem 2.3. The essential
assumption that makes this possible is that every query runs on disjoint datasets. Unfortunately, data
analysts could ignore this assumption when writing queries. To illustrate this point, we present the code
in Figure 4. Query q produces a ǫ-DP histogram of the colors found in the argument dataset, which
rows are of type Color and variable bins enumerates all the possible values of such type. The code
partitions the dataset by using the function id :: Color → Color (line 2) and executes the aggregation
counting query (dpCount) in each partition (line 3)—function fromList creates a map from a list of
pairs. The attentive reader could notice that dpCount is applied to the original dataset rather than the
partitions. This type of errors could lead to break privacy as well as inconsistencies when estimating the
required privacy budget. A correct implementation consists on executing dpCount on the corresponding
partition as shown in the commented line 4.
To catch possible coding errors as the one shown above, DPella deploys an static information-flow
control (IFC) analysis similar to that provided by MAC [39]. IFC ensures that queries run by dpPart do
not perform queries on shared datasets (as dataset in Figure 4). For that, DPella attaches provenance
labels to datasets Data s r indicating to which part of the query they are associated with and propagates
that information accordingly. For instance, dataset in q belongs to the top-level fragment of the query
rather than to sub-queries executed in each partition—and DPella will raise an error at compile time.
Instead, if we comment line 3 and uncomment line 4, the query q is successfully run by DPella (when there
is enough privacy budget) since every partition is only accessing their own partitioned data (denoted by
variable ds). The implemented IFC mechanism is transparent to data analysts and curators, i.e., they
do not need to understand how it works. Analysts and curators only need to know that, when the IFC
analysis raises an alarm, is due to a possibly access to non-disjoint datasets when using dpPart.
3.1.3 Aggregations
DPella presents primitives to count (dpCount), sum (dpSum), and average (dpAvg) rows in datasets. These
primitives take an argument eps ::ǫ, a dataset, and build a Laplace mechanism which is eps-differentially
private from which a noisy result gets return as a term of type Value Double. The purpose of data type
Value a is two fold: to encapsulate noisy values of type a originating from aggregations of data, and
to store information about its accuracy—intuitively, how “noisy” the value is (explained in Section 4).
The injected noise of these queries gets adjusted depending on three parameters: the value of type ǫ,
the accumulated stability of the dataset s, and the sensitivity of the query (recall Definition 2.2). More
specifically, the Laplace mechanism used by DPella uses accumulated stability s to scale the noise, i.e.,
it consider b from Theorem 2.1 as b = s · ∆Q
ǫ
. The sensitivity of DPella’s aggregations are hard-coded
into the implementation—similar to what PINQ does. The sensitivities of dpSum and dpAvg are set to 1
and 2, respectively, by applying a clipping function (r→ Double). This function maps the values under
scrutiny into the interval [−1, 1] before executing the query. The sensitivity of dpCount and dpMax is
set to 1. To implement the Laplace mechanism, the type constrain Stb s in dpCount, dpSum, and dpAvg
demands the accumulated stability parameter s to be a type-level natural number in order to to obtain
a term-level representation when injecting noise. Finally, primitive dpMax implements noisy-max. This
query takes a scoring function (r→ Double), applies it to every row, adds a uniform noise to every score,
and returns the index of the row with the highest noisy score. This primitive becomes relevant to obtain
the winner option in elections without singling out any voter. However, it requires that the stability of
the dataset to be 1 in order to be sound [40]. DPella guarantees such requirement by typing: the type
of the given dataset as argument is Data 1 r, i.e., its accumulated stability is set to 1.
10
-- Accuracy analysis (data analyst)
accuracy :: Query (Value a)→ β → α
-- Norms (data analyst)
norm∞ :: [Value Double ]→ Value [Double ]
norm2 :: [Value Double ]→ Value [Double ]
norm1 :: [Value Double ]→ Value [Double ]
rmsd :: [Value Double ]→ Value [Double ]
-- Accuracy combinators (data analyst)
add :: [Value Double ]→ Value Double
neg :: Value Double→ Value Double
Figure 5: DPella API: Part II
3.1.4 Privacy budget and execution of queries
The primitive budget statically computes how much privacy budget is required to run a query. It is
worth notice that DPella returns an upper bound of the required privacy budget rather than the exact
one—an expected consequence of using a type-system to compute it and provide early feedback to data
analysts. Finally, the primitive dpEval is used by data curators to run queries (Query a) under given
privacy budgets (ǫ), where datasets are just lists of rows ([r ]). It assumes that the initial accumulated
stability as 1 (Data 1 r) since the dataset has not yet gone through any transformation, and DPella will
automatically calculate the accumulated stability for datasets affected by subsequent transformations
via the Haskell’s type system. This primitive returns a computation of type IO a, which in Haskell are
computations responsible to perform side-effects—in this case, obtaining randomness from the system in
order to implement the Laplace mechanism.
4 Accuracy
To deal with accuracy, DPella uses the data type Value a responsible to store a result of type a as well as
information about its accuracy. For instance, a term of type Value Double stores a noisy number (e.g.,
coming from executing dpCount) together with its accuracy in terms of a bound on the noise introduced
to protect privacy.
DPella provides an static analysis capable to compute the accuracy of queries via the following
function
accuracy :: Query (Value a)→ β → α
which takes as an argument a query and returns a function, called inverse Cumulative Distribution
Function (iCDF), capturing the theoretical error α for a given confidence 1-β. Function accuracy
does not execute queries but rather symbolically interpret all of its components in order to compute the
accuracy of the result based on the sub-queries and how data gets aggregated. DPella follows the principle
of improving accuracy calculations by detecting statistical independence. For that, it implements taint
analysis [23] in order to track if values were drawn from statistically independent distributions.
4.1 Accuracy calculations
DPella starts by generating iCDFs at the time of running aggregations based on the following known
result of the Laplace mechanism:
Definition 4.1 (Accuracy for the Laplace mechanism). Given a randomized query Q˜(·) : db → R
implemented with the Laplace mechanism as in Theorem 2.1, where the scale is adjusted by stability s,
we have that
Pr
[
|Q˜(D)−Q(D)| > log(1/β) · s · ∆Q
ǫ
]
6 β (3)
Consequently, DPella stores the iCDF λβ → log(1/β) · s · ∆Q
ǫ
for the values of type Value Double
returned by aggregation primitives like dpCount, dpSum, and dpAvg. However, queries are often more
complex than just calling aggregation primitives—as shown by CDF2 in Figure 1b. In this light, DPella
provides combinators responsible to aggregate noisy values, while computing its iCDFs based on the
iCDFs of the arguments. Figure 5 shows DPella API when dealing with accuracy.
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Figure 6: Union vs. Chernoff bounds
4.1.1 Norms
DPella presents several primitives to aggregate the magnitudes of several errors predictions into a single
measure—a useful tool when dealing with vectors. Primitives norm∞, norm2, and norm1 take a list of
values of type Value Double, where each of them carries accuracy information, and produces a single
value (or vector) that contains a list of elements (Value [Double]), which accuracy is set to be the well-
known ℓ∞-, ℓ2-, ℓ1-norms, respectively. Finally, primitive rmsd implements root-mean-square deviation
among the elements given as arguments—i.e., the quadratic mean of the differences between the noisy
results and the original answer. In our examples, we focus on using norm∞, but other norms are available
for the taste, and preference, of data analysts.
4.1.2 Adding values
The primitive add aggregates values and, in order to compute accuracy of the addition, it tries to apply
the Chernoff bound if all the values are statistically independent; otherwise, it applies the union bound.
More precisely, for the next definitions we assume that primitive add receives n terms v1 ::Value Double,
v2 :: Value Double, ... , vn :: Value Double. To support subtraction, DPella provides primitive neg
responsible to change the sign of a given value. Importantly, since we are calculating the theoretical
error, we should consider random variables rather than specific numbers. The next definition specifies
how add behaves when applying union bound.
Definition 4.2 (add using union bound). Given n > 2 random variables Vj with their respective iCDF j,
where j ∈ 1 . . . n, and αj = iCDFj(βn ), then the addition Z =
∑n
j=1 Vj has the following accuracy:
Pr[|Z| >∑nj=1 αj ] 6 β (4)
Observe that to compute the iCDF of Z, the formula uses the iCDFs from the operands applied to
β
n
, which is done to obtain an error bound Z with confidence 1− β. Union bound makes no assumption
about the distribution of the random variables Vj .
In contrast, the Chernoff bound often provides a tighter error estimation than the commonly used
union bound when adding several statistically independent queries sampled from a Laplace distribution.
To illustrate this point, Figure 6 shows that difference for the cdf2 function we presented in Section 2 with
ǫ = 0.5 (for each DP sub-query) and β = 0.1—the x-axis denotes the number of sub-queries aggregated,
while the y axis is the estimated α. Clearly, the Chernoff bound is asymptotically much better when
estimating accuracy, while the union bound works best with a reduced number of sub-queries—observe
how lines get crossed in Figure 6. In this light, and when possible, DPella computes both union bound
and Chernoff bound and selects the tighter error estimation. However, to apply Chernoff bound, DPella
needs to be certain that the events are independent. Before explaining how DPella detects that, we gives
an specification of the formula we use for Chernoff.
Definition 4.3 (add using Chernoff bound [41]). Given n > 2 independent random variables Vj ∼
Lap(0, bj), where j ∈ 1 . . . n, bM = max {bj}j=1...n, and ν = max{
√∑n
j=1 b
2
j , bM
√
ln 2
β
}, then the
addition Z =
∑n
j=1 Vj has the following accuracy:
Pr[|Z| > (ν + 0.00001)
√
8 ln 2
β
] 6 β (5)
The presence of the number 0.00001 in the formula is to obtain a number strictly greater than ν in
that part of the formula so that the formula described above can be used—any other number that yields
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1 totalCount :: Query (Value Double)
2 totalCount = do
3 v1 ← dpCount 0.3 ds1
4 v2 ← dpCount 0.25 ds2
5 ...
6 v100 ← dpCount 0.5 ds100
7 return (add [v1, v2, . . , v100 ])
Figure 7: Combination of sub-queries results
Category Application Programs
PINQ-like
CDFs [27] cdf1, cdf2,
cdfSmart
Term fre-
quency [2]
queryFreq,
queriesFreq,
ip2location
Network
analysis [27]
packetSize,
portSize
Cumulative
sums [28]
cumulSum1
cumulSum2
cumulSumSmart
Counting
queries
Range queries via Identity i_n
Range queries via Histograms [30] h_n
Range queries via Wavelet [31] y_n
Table 1: Implemented literature examples
a number strictly greater than ν works as well. We next explain how DPella checks that values come
from statistically independent sampled variables.
4.1.3 Detecting statistical independence
To detect statistical independence, we apply taint analysis when considering terms of type Value a.
Specifically, every time a result of type Value Double gets generated by an aggregation query in DPella’s
API (i.e., dpCount, dpSum, etc.), it gets assigned a label indicating that it is untainted and thus sta-
tistically independent. The label also carries information about the scale of the Laplace distribution
from which it was sampled—a useful information when applying Definition 4.3. When the primitive add
receives all untainted values as arguments, the accuracy of the aggregation is determined by the best
estimation provided by either the union bound (Definition 4.2) or the Chernoff bound (Definition 4.3).
Importantly, values produced by add are considered tainted since they depend on other results. When
add receives any tainted argument, it proceeds to estimate the error of the addition by just using union
bound.
To illustrate how our taint analysis works, Figure 7 presents the query plan totalCount which adds
the results of hundred dpCount queries over different datasets, namely ds1, ds2, . . . , ds100. (The ...
denotes code intentionally left unspecified.) The code calls the primitive add with the results of calling
dpCount. (We use [x1, x2, x3 ] to denote the list with elements x1, x2, and x3.) What would it be then
the theoretical error of totalCount? The accuracy calculation depends on whether all the values are
untainted in line 7. When no dependencies are detected between v1, v2, . . . , v100, namely all the values
are untainted, DPella applies Chernoff bound in order to give a tighter error estimation. Instead, for
instance, if v3 were computed as an aggregation of v1 and v2, e.g., let v3 = add [v1, v2 ], then line 7 applies
union bound since v3 is a tainted value. With taint analysis, DPella is capable to detect dependencies
among terms of type Value Double, and leverages that information to apply different concentrations
bounds.
5 Case studies
In this section, we will discuss the advantages and limitations of our programming framework. Moreover,
we will go in-depth into using DPella to analyze the interplay of privacy and accuracy parameters in
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

1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1


WR4


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


I4


1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


H4


1 1 1 1
1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 −1


Y4
Figure 8: Workload of all range queries and query strategies for 4 ranges
hierarchical histograms.
5.1 DPella expressiveness
First, we start by exploring the expressiveness of DPella. For this, we have built several analyses found
in the DP literature—see Table 1—which we classify into two categories, PINQ-like queries and counting
queries. The former class allows us to compare DPella expressivity with the one of PINQ, while the latter
allow us to compare DPella expressivity with the one of APEx.
PINQ-like queries We have implemented most of the examples that have been implemented in
PINQ [2, 27], such as, different versions of CDFs (sequential, parallel, and hybrid) and network tracing-
like analyses. Additionally, we considered examples of cumulative sums [28]—which are queries that
share some commonalities with CDFs. By construction, DPella’s support these queries naturally, since
the expressiveness of DPella relies on its primitives that were designed following PINQ’s one very closely.
However, as stated in previous sections, our framework goes a step further and exposes to data analysts
the accuracy bound achieved by the specific implementation. This specific feature allows the data ana-
lyst to reason about accuracy of the results—without actually executing the query—by varying i) the
strategy of the implementation ii) the parameters of the query. For instance, in Section 2, we have shown
how the analyst can inspect the error of a sequential and parallel strategy to compute the CDF of packet
lengths. Furthermore, the data analyst can take advantage of DPella being an embedded DSL and write
a Haskell function that takes any of the approaches (cdf1 or cdf2) and varies epsilon aiming to certain
error tolerance (for a fixed confidence interval), or vice versa. Such a function can be as simple as a
brute force analysis or as complex as an heuristic algorithm.
Counting queries The second class of queries that we considered are counting queries. More specif-
ically, we focused on range queries, a specific subclass of counting queries. We considered this class to
compare our approach with the one implemented in the tool APEx [18].
To answering counting queries, APEx uses the matrix mechanism [29]. This algorithm answers a set
of linear queries (called the workload) by calibrating the noise to specific properties of the workload while
preserving differential privacy. More in details, the matrix mechanism uses some query strategies as an
intermediate device to answer a workload. The mechanism returns a DP version of the query strategies
(obtained using the Laplace or Gaussian mechanism), from which noisy answers of the workload are
derived. By adding independent noise to the strategies instead of adding it to the whole workload, the
matrix mechanism exploits the correlation between the queries in order to add less noise for the same
level of privacy, boosting in this way the accuracy of the results.
The matrix mechanism achieves an almost optimal error on counting queries. In order to achieve
this error, the algorithm uses several non-trivial transformations which cannot be implemented easily in
terms of other components. APEx implements it as a black-box and we could do the same in DPella.
Instead, in this section we show how DPella can be directly used to answer sets of counting queries using
some of the ideas behind the design of the matrix mechanism, and how these answers improve with
respect to answering the queries naively, thanks to the use of partition and the Chernoff bound.
To do this, we have implemented several strategies to answer an specific workload WR: the set of
all range queries over a domain. Figure 8 illustrates the workload that would be answer for a frequency
count of four ranges. The identity strategy I4, represents 4 queries (number of rows) computing the
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Figure 9: Error of each range query in WR using strategy In with n = 512, ǫ = 1, and β = 0.05
noisy count of each range (number of columns). The hierarchical strategy H4 contains seven queries
representing a binary hierarchy of sums, for instance, the first row represent the sum of all elements, the
second one is the sum of half of the ranges, and so on. Finally, the wavelet strategy Y4 contains four
queries representing the Haar wavelet matrix.
To replicate the behavior of answering a workloadWR for n ranges using a strategy A in DPella we
follow three steps:
1) Partition the table for each range and perform a noisy count in each partition obtaining x˜ =
[q˜1, q˜2, · · · , q˜n], here each q˜i has type Value a
2) Compute the queries described by an strategy A with x˜
strategy :: [ [Int] ]→ [Value a]→ [ [Value a ] ]
strategy matA vectX = ...
Note that instead of adding each noisy count to obtain the value of a row, we return a list of queries
involved in the computation. For instance, for strategy H4 each row will be represented as follows:
H4x˜ =


1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1




q˜1
q˜2
q˜3
q˜4

 =


[q˜1, q˜2, q˜3, q˜4]
[q˜1, q˜2]
[q˜3, q˜4]
[q˜1]
[q˜2]
[q˜3]
[q˜4]


(~y1)
(~y2)
(~y3)
(~y4)
(~y5)
(~y6)
(~y7)
Which produces ~y = [~y1, ~y2, ~y3, ~y4, ~y5, ~y6, ~y7], this is, strategy matH vectX = [y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7 ]
3) Construct the noisy answer of WR using ~y and adding each row using operator add. For instance,
answering the 3rd range (3rd column) query of WR4 can be done by adding ~y2 and ~y6, this is
add (y2 ++ y6) = add [ q˜1, q˜2, q˜3 ].
Observe that there are several ways to combine ~yi lists to answer WR4, in particular, we could have
used only the identity matrix ~y4 · · · ~y7 wich would correspond to using I4 strategy. Additionally, since
we delayed the combination of noisy values q˜i until the end, any possible combination will yield (at least)
the same error as using strategy I4. We can conclude that by following the previous steps the more
accurate answer for WR will be yield by the identity strategy. This is not unexpected, since in order to
use the other queries strategies more efficiently we would need transformation similar to the ones used
in the matrix mechanism.
In order to understand how the accuracy of our method based on the identity strategy compares
to the one of the matrix mechanism we show in Figure 9 the error of answering each range query (i.e.,
each row) in WR with strategy In and n = 512. While we use the same kind of plot, this error cannot
be directly compared with the one shown in Figure 7 of [29], since we use a different error metrics:
(α,β)-accuracy vs MSE. Nonetheless, we share the tendency of having lower error on small ranges and
significant error on large ranges. Now, since the noisy values that will be added (using the function add)
are statistically independent, we can use the Chernoff bound to show that the error is approximately
O(√n) for each range query, and a maximum error of O(√n logn) for answering any query inWR. If we
compare our maximum error O(√n logn) with the one of the matrix mechanism based on the identity
strategy O(n/ǫ2), it becomes evident how Chernoff bound is useful to provides tighter accuracy bounds.
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1 hierarchical1 [e1, e2, e3 ] dat = do
2 -- h1 :: Map Gen (Value Double)
3 -- h2 :: Map (Gen, Age) (Value Double)
4 -- h3 :: Map (Gen, Age, Nationality) (Value Double)
5 h1 ← byGen e1 dat
6 h2 ← byGenAge e2 dat
7 h3 ← byGenAgeNat e3 dat
8 return (h1, h2, h3)
(a) Hierarchical histogram I: distribute budget among the levels
9 hierarchical2 e dat = do
10 h3 ← byGenAgeNat e dat
11 h2 ← level2 h3
12 h1 ← level1 h3
13 return (h1, h2, h3)
(b) Hierarchical histogram II: spend budget only on the most detailed histogram
Figure 10: Implementation of hierarchical histograms
Unfortunately, as previously stated, the error of strategies Hn and Yn in DPella is not better than the
one of the strategy In, so we cannot reach the same accuracy the matrix mechanism achieves with these
strategies (see Figure 7 of [29]). This limitation can be addressed by leveraging the fact that DPella is
a programming framerwork that could be extended by adding the matrix mechanism—and some other
features—as black-box primitives.
5.2 Privacy and accuracy trade-off analysis in DPella
We showcase how DPella helps the analyst to reason about the privacy and accuracy trade-off while
designing a query. We study histograms with certain hierarchical structure (commonly seen in Census
Bureaus analyses) where different accuracy requirements are imposed per level and where varying one
privacy or accuracy parameter can have a cascade impact on the privacy or accuracy of others. We
consider the scenario where we would like to generate histograms from the Adult database7 in order
to perform studies on gender balance. The information that we need to mine is not only an histogram
of the genders (for simplicity, just male and female) but also how the gender distributes over age, and
within that, how age distributes over nationality—thus exposing a hierarchical structure of three levels.
As a data analyst faced with this task, how should we proceed to implement the analysis?
Our first approach is depicted in Figure 10a, where query hierarchical1 generates three histograms
with different levels of details. This query puts together the results produced by queries byGen, byGenAge,
and byGenAgeNationality where each query generates an histogram of the specified set of attributes.
Observe that these sub-queries are called with potentially different epsilons, namely e1, e2, and e3, then,
we expect hierarchical1 to be e1+e2+e3-differentially private.
We need to proceed to explore the possibilities to tune the privacy and accuracy parameters to our
needs. In this case, we want a confidence of 95% for accuracy, i.e., β = 0.05, with a total budget of 3
(ǫ = 3). We could manually try to take the budget ǫ = 3 and distribute it to the different histograms
in many different ways and analyze the implication for accuracy by calling accuracy on each sub-query.
Instead, we write a small (simple, brute force) optimizer in Haskell that splits the budget uniformly
among the queries, i.e., e1 = 1, e2 = 1, and e3 = 1, and tries to find the minimum epsilon that meets
the accuracy demands per histogram. In other words, we are interested in minimizing the privacy loss at
each level bounding the maximum accepted error. The optimizer essentially adjusts the different epsilons
and calls accuracy during the minimization process. To ensure termination, the optimizer aborts after
a fixed number of iterations, or when the local budget ei is exhausted.
Table 2 shows some of our findings. The first row shows what happens when we impose an error of
100 at every level of detail, i.e., each bar in all the histograms could be at most +/− 100 off. Then, we
only need to spend a little part of our budget—the optimizer finds the minimum epsilons that adheres
to the accuracy constrains. Instead, the second row shows that if we ask to be gradually more accurate
7https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult
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Histogram α tolerance Status ǫ α
byGen 100 X 0.06 61.48
byGenAge 100 X 0.06 96.13
byGenAgeNat 100 X 0.11 85.74
byGen 10 X 0.41 8.99
byGenAge 50 X 0.16 36.05
byGenAgeNat 5 × MaxBud 1 9.43
byGen 5 X 0.76 4.85
byGenAge 5 × MaxBud 1 5.76
byGenAgeNat 10 X 0.96 9.82
Table 2: Budgeting with α tolerances, β = 0.05, & total ǫ = 3
h1-ǫ1 h2-ǫ1 h3-ǫ1 h1-ǫ3 h2-ǫ3 h3-ǫ3
50
100
11 17
29
4 6 9
105
45
9
35
15
3
α
hierarchical1
hierarchical2
h1 = byGen, h2 = byGenAge, h3 = byGenAgeNat
Figure 11: hierarchical1 vs. hierarchical2
on more detailed histograms, then the optimizer aborted at the most detailed one. While it could fulfill
the first two demands, it aborted on the most detailed histogram (byGenAgeNat) since it could not find
an epsilon that fulfills that requirement—the best we can do is spending all the budget and obtain and
error bound of 9.43. Finally, the last row shows what happens if we want gradually tighter error bounds
on the less detailed histograms. In this case, the middle layer can be “almost” fulfilled by expending all
the budget and obtaining an error bound of 5.76 instead of 5. While the results from Table 2 could be
acceptable for some data analysts, they might not be for others.
We propose an alternative manner to implement the same query which consists on spending privacy
budget only for the most detailed histogram. As shown in Figure 10b, this new approach spends all
the budget e on calling h3 ← byGenAgeNat e dat. Subsequently, the query builds the other histograms
based on the information extracted from the most detailed one. For that, we add the noisy values of h3
(using helper functions level2 and level1) creating the rest of the histograms representing the Cartesian
products of gender and age, and gender, respectively. These methodology will use add and norm∞ to
compute the derived histograms, and therefore will not consume more privacy budget. Observe that
the query proceeds in a bottom-up fashion, i.e., it starts with the most detailed histogram and finishes
with the less detailed one. Now that we have two implementations, which one is better? Which one
yields the better trade-offs between privacy and accuracy? For that, Figure 11 shows the accuracy of the
different level of histograms, i.e., h1, h2, and h3, when fixing β = 0.05 and a global budget of ǫ = 1 (h1-ǫ1,
h2-ǫ2, and h3-ǫ3) and ǫ = 3 (h1-ǫ3, h2-ǫ3, and h3-ǫ3)—we obtained all this information by running
repetitively the function accuracy. Form the graphics, we can infer that the splitting of the privacy
budget per level often gives rise to more accurate histograms. However, observe the exception when ǫ = 3
for hierarchical2: in this case, hierarchical1 will use an ǫ = 1 in that histogram so it will receive a
more noisy count than using ǫ = 3.
6 Related work
PINQ [2] is a programming framework for writing queries that has inspired most of the subsequent works.
Queries can use basic aggregation mechanisms as well as transformations similar to those supported
by the DPella API. PINQ uses dynamic tracking and sensitivity information to guarantee privacy of
computations. Airavat [3] is a programming framework similar to PINQ but based on the map-reduce
model. wPINQ [42] is an extension of the PINQ framework that supports a more general form of join
operators. DJoin [36] enforces differential privacy for distributed databases, but for a restricted join
operator. Flex [38] enforces differential privacy for a broader range of query plans, using the notion of
elastic sensitivity. None of these works keeps track of accuracy, nor static analysis for privacy or accuracy.
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We leave as future work to support join operations with accuracy—which is an active area of research.
Fuzz [4] is a programming language which enforces (pure) differential privacy of computations using
a linear type system which keeps track of program sensitivity. DFuzz [6] is a generalization of Fuzz
based on linear dependent types, a richer typing discipline which is able to accommodate recursion.
Adaptive Fuzz [10] is an adaptation of Fuzz which supports adaptive data analysis using a combination
of static and dynamic techniques. Finally, Fuzzi [13] is a three layer system which supports a more rich
class of data analyses. Ektelo [12] is a programming framework from writing privacy-aware differentially
private computations based on the matrix mechanism and other components. Ektelo allows one to write
quite involved query strategies. While several of Ektelo components are not supported in the current
implementation of DPella, these can be easily added as black-box components. All these systems support
reasoning about privacy, but not about accuracy. In contrast, DPella supports accuracy but restricts the
programming framework to rule out certain analysis (e.g., adaptive ones) where supporting accuracy in
a compositional manner is still an open problem.
Hoare2 [7] is a programming language which enforces (pure or approximate) differential privacy using
program verification. Hoare2 combines a graded monad with a relational refinement type system which
keeps track of the relationship between two executions of the program on adjacent inputs. PrivInfer [8] is
an extension of Hoare2 that supports differentially private Bayesian programming. Both works are based
on a relaxation of probabilistic couplings, introduced in [43]. In principle, both works allow programs
that branch over query outputs. However, their verification component is too weak to prove interesting
properties for such programs. Subsquent work [44] clarifies the relationship with probabilistic couplings
and provides stronger support to reason about programs that branch on query outputs, such as the
sparse vector technique. Later, Albarghouthi and Hsu [45] improve the coupling-based approach and
derive automated methods for proving privacy of a broad range of computations. Zhang et al. [9] develop
a similar automated approach but based on the idea of aligning the randomness of two executions of a
program. More recently, this approach has been extended to deal with more involved algorithms using
an extra shadow execution [46]. Again. all these works focus on privacy for advanced data analyses while
neglecting accuracy.
In contrast, as we discussed before, several tools also support reasoning about accuracy, but they
restrict in general the kind of queries they support. GUPT [15] is a tool based on the sample-and-
aggregate framework for differential privacy [47]. GUPT allows analysts to specify the target accuracy
of the output, and compute privacy from it—or vice versa. This approach has inspired several of the
subsequent works and also our design. The limitation of GUPT is that it supports only analyses that fit
in the sample-and-aggregate framework. While this framework has several remarkable advantages, such
as allowing arbitrary queries to be run on the subsampled data, it only effectively supports analyses that
can be aggregated through some basic aggregation operations. In contrast, DPella supports analyses of a
more general class, such as the ones we discussed in Section 2 and Section 5. In principle, some of these
analyses (e.g. CDF) could be seen as a post-processed combination of analyses that also GUPT supports,
the further step that DPella takes is that it also allows to reason about the accuracy of the combined
form, rather that just about the individual queries. PSI [17] offers to the data analyst an interface for
selecting either the level of accuracy that she wants to reach, or the level of privacy she wants to impose.
The error estimates that PSI provides are similar to the ones that are supported in DPella. However,
similarly to GUPT, PSI supports only a limited set of transformations and primitives, and in its current
form it does not allow analysts to submit their own (programmed) queries. Once again, DPella can be
seen as a programming environment that could be combined with some of the analyses supported by
tools similar to PSI or GUPT in order to reason about the accuracy of the combined queries.
Ligett et al. [48] propose a framework for developing differentially private algorithms under accuracy
constraints. This allows one to chose a given level of accuracy first, and then finding the private algorithm
meeting this accuracy. This framework is so far limited to empirical risk minimization problems and it
is not supported by a system, yet.
APEx [18] is probably the most mature framework that has similar goals as DPella since it supports
reasoning about both accuracy and privacy. Moreover, it allows data analysts to write queries as SQL-like
statements. However, the model that APEx uses is quite different from the one used by DPella. First,
APEx consider only three kind of queries: WCQ (counting queries), ICQ (iceberg counting queries), and
TCQ (top-k counting queries). To answer WCQ queries, as discussed in Section 5, APEx uses the matrix
mechanism. While the matrix mechanism theoretical error is formulated in term of MSE (see [29]), APEx
uses Monte Carlo simulations to achieve accuracy bounds in terms of α and β, and to determine the least
privacy parameter (ǫ) that fits those bounds. We have shown how DPella con be used to answer queries
based on the identity strategies and the use of partition and concentration bounds. To use effectively
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other query strategies we would need to extend DPella with the matrix mechanism as a black-box. This
can be done easily but in this paper we want to keep the focus on the programming support offered by
DPella and we leave this for future work.
ICQ queries return the aggregate of bins greater than a threshold. To answer these queries APEx
applies novel data dependent accuracy bounds, so different datasets might require different ǫs that fit the
bounds—DPella provides only data independent analyses. TCQ queries are a generalization of report-
noisy-max, this generalization is not yet supported by DPella. While APEx supports advanced queries,
it does not provide means to reason about combinations of analyses, e.g., it does not support reasoning
about the accuracy of a query using results from WCQs queries to perform TCQs ones. DPella instead
has been designed specifically to support the combination of different queries. So, we can think about
DPella as complimentary to APEx.
Focusing on core calculi, Barthe et al. [28] devise a method for proving differential privacy using
Hoare logic. Their method uses accuracy bounds for the Laplace Mechanism for proving privacy bounds
of the Propose-Test-Release Mechanism, but cannot be used to prove accuracy bounds of arbitrary com-
putations. Later, Barthe et al. [40] develop a program logic for proving accuracy bounds of differentially
private computations based on the Laplace Mechanism. Further, Barthe et al [49] use this logic, in com-
bination with a logic supporting reasoning by coupling, to verify differentially private algorithms whose
privacy guarantee depends on the accuracy guarantee of some sub-component. More recently, Smith et
al. [26] propose an automated approach for computing accuracy bounds. However, these methods use
Union Bound and do not attempt to reason about probabilistic independence to obtain tighter bounds.
7 Conclusions
DPella is an expressive programming framework for reasoning about privacy, accuracy, and their trade-
offs. DPella leverages features of Haskell type-system to achieve expressiveness, and uses taint analysis
to detect probabilistic independence and derive tighter accuracy bounds using Chernoff bounds.
We believe that the principles behind DPella, i.e., the use of concentration bounds guided by taint
analysis, could also be used to support other mechanisms (e.g., Gaussian) and thus providing support
to (ǫ, δ)-DP, or Renyi-DP [50] as well as advanced forms of compositions. We leave as future work
to determine how to adapt the types and symbolic interpreters of DPella to support such extensions.
Other future work also includes lifting the restriction that programs should not branch on query outputs,
and extending the scope of the language to other notions of privacy, including concentrated differential
privacy [51], zero concentrated differential privacy [52], or truncated concentrated differential privacy [53].
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